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EVIDENCE VERIFICATION COMPLICATIONS
WITH SOLID-STATE DRIVES
Ryne Teague , M.S.
Michael Black, Ph.D.
University of South Alabama
Mobile, AL 36688
251-460-6880
mblack@southalabama.edu

ABSTRACT
Solid-state drives operate on a combination of technologies that create a barrier between the
physical data being written and the digital forensics investigator. This barrier prevents the
application of evidence verification methods developed for magnetic disk drives because the barrier
prevents the investigator from directly controlling and therefore verifying that the underlying
physical data has not been manipulated. The purpose of this research is to identify a period of
inactivity where the underlying physical data is not being manipulated by wear-leveling or
garbage-collection routines such that evidence can be reliably verified with existing hashing
algorithms. An experiment is conducted on Samsung drives. The limitation of this method is it
does not enable the verification of deleted data and will be one size of solid-state drives. The
results show that after an hour and a half, the solid-state drives examined will produce the same
consistently until ten hours.
Keywords: SSD , verification, validation, chain of custody, solid-state drive

1. INTRODUCTION
Methods for forensics and storage techniques
have been developed around the physical
design of magnetic hard drives and the idea of
evidence verification [11[2]. Digital evidence
altered during an investigation can be ruled
inadmissible in a court of law. Hard disk drives
and older forms of storage have proven
techniques to prevent changes to data [1]131[4] .
It is also possible to provide evidence that a
hard disk drive has not been altered using a
hashing program. With these methods, digital
evidence can be presented in court with little
question of their integrity [2] [3].
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The design of solid-state drives has
drastically changed from the design of hard
disk drives and because of this, evidence
verification procedures used for magnetic
drives will need to be redesigned for use in
solid-state drives [1]. A solid-state drive's
storage medium has a limited number of writes
before a section of the memory will fail ,
rendering the entire drive useless [1][2]. A
component of the solid-state drive is the solidstate drive controller that holds firmware used
to increase the lifespan of the drive [l] . The
solid-state controller's introduction has led to a
wider adoption of solid-state technology, but it
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has also complicated standards for digital
evidence in forensics investigations [l ].
Previous evidence verification methods fail
due to certain firmware processes within the
solid-state drive controller. Users are not given
the same level of control over solid-state drives
as they are hard disk drives [11[2]. The
mechanism to prevent changes in HDDs works
because of the lack of a solid-state controller
equivalence inside HDDs drive [4].
The research goal and question were
identified by searching for solutions to the
problems from solid-state drives that forensic
investigators face. The research goal is to
explore periods of inactivity in solid-state
firmware
processes,
also
known
as
housekeeping algorithms, that affect evidence
verification. The research question is as
follows. Can periods of inactivity be identified
during which housekeeping algorithms of a
solid-state drive's controller does not affect the
validation process done by digital forensics
investigators using a court accepting hashing
methodology?

2. JVlETHOD
The goal of this research is to contribute to
digital forensics knowledge base in the areas of
solid-state drives and evidence verification by
finding solutions without physically altering
the solid-state drive. This experiment used the
quantitative experimental research approach
where a problem had been identified, data was
collected, and a hypothesis had been
formulated and to be tested. The experiment
was designed to observe one condition which
was the length of time between the solid-state
drive to reach a static state. The results were
measured and stored using software and are
relevant to the research goals.
The purpose of this study is to identify if
there is a period of inactivity where the
validation process used by a forensic
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investigator is not being manipulated by wearleveling or garbage-collection routines. The test
has been conducted as a controlled experiment.
A period of inactivity is defined as a time
when the solid-state drive is not manipulating
the underlying data. Inactivity is verified by
hashing the drive and verifying the output.
Based on Bell's experiment, any window of
inactivity is most likely to be soon after the
drive has been powered up therefore the test
will only be repeated for two hours.
The researcher used four consumer-rated
solid-state drives with a capacity of one
hundred and twenty gigabytes to one hundred
and twenty-eight gigabytes for this experiment.
As stated before, Samsung controls most of the
solid-state market. Therefore, all the solid-state
drives used were manufactured by Samsung
varying in size between one hundred and
twenty and one hundred and twenty-eight
gigabytes.
An environment was necessary to create a
test bed to run consistent experiments on each
solid-state drive. The environment consisted of
one
desktop
computer,
the
necessary
input / output devices for the computer, and
four solid-state drives. Each solid-state drive
was connected to the experiment computer
directly through a SATA port. The experiment
computer was installed with Ubuntu Server
14.04.05
LTS
operating system.
After
installation,
the operating system was
immediately patched with up-to-date software
packages. The only additional software
installed were VIM, a simple text editor and
parted, a command line tool used to partition
drives. A Linux operating system was chosen
over Windows because Windows modifies
system volume information on drives utilizing
NTFS file systems which may issue write
commands to the experiment drives. No such
requirement exists on the Ubuntu operating
system. During the experiments, data sent to
the test drives was controlled by scripts.
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The experiment began by connecting each
solid-state drive tested to the experiment
machine. The machine was then powered on
and booted to the Ubuntu operating system.
Each solid-state drive had both data and
power cables disconnected and reconnected.
This was done to remove the frozen status of
the solid-state drives. Upon booting, an
operating system issues an AT A Freeze
command that prevents any security-related
changes to the solid-state drives. Power cycling
the test drives unfroze each drive and allowed
the secure-erase command to operate properly.
Four terminals were opened to execute the
experiment scripts on each of the test drives.
Each terminal was set to a different directory
where the experiment script was copied. Each
experiment script was then started and passed
the path to a solid-state drive and the location
of a unique mount point as parameters. The
syntax to run the script at the command line is
the following:
./ main_ 1.sh <drive> <mountpoint>
The script began by issuing the secureerase command erasing all contents the drive.
The script then partitioned, formatted, and
mounted the solid-state drives. By writing
standard text files , the solid-state drives were
then filled to ninety percent capacity, deleted
to twenty-five percent capacity, and then filled
to fifty-percent capacity. Upon completion of
all file write and deletion, an MD5 hashing
program was immediately executed for two
hours on each solid-state drive.
It should be noted that the solid-state
drives never reached one-hundred percent
capacity. It was considered rare in a real-world
scenario that a user's drive would ever reach
maximum capacity. The deletion of data
created slack space which should cause
garbage-collection and wear-leveling to be
triggered. The process of writing, deleting, and
writing files again was intended to ensure
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every available cell of the test drive to be
written to at least once and to have cells that
are marked for deletion. Together, these scripts
created a scenario that would trigger garbagecollection and wear-leveling routines to
activate.
In total, the experiment was conducted
four times. In the first two experiments, the
MD5 hashing program executed for two hours.
In the last two runs the MD5 hashing program
executed for ten hours. The time for one
experiment was originally estimated to take
between two to three hours for each solid-state
drive, totaling between ten to fifteen hours for
all. The actual time for completion of four
tests executed on four drives concurrently took
between twenty-seven to twenty-nine hours.
The detailed experiment steps are below.
This experiment has eleven steps. Steps three
through ten were implemented in scripts
developed by the researcher. All scripts were
run from the experimenter's machine .
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Experimenter's machine was powered
on with
four
solid-state
drives
connected plus an additional magnetic
disk drive that hosts Ubuntu 14.04.05
lts operating system.
The experimenter disconnected the
power and data cable from each solidstate drive from the machine and then
reconnects both cables again.
Each solid-state drive was wiped by
being sent a Secure-Erase AT A
command which defaulted the drive to
its original, out of the box state.
The script then paused until each drive
completed the Secure-Erase.
Each solid-state drive was then
formatted with the NTFS file system.
Each solid-state drive was logically
mounted to the experimenter's system.
Each solid-state drive was then written
to ninety percent capacity.
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8. The drives were written with files
ranging from one byte to thirty-two
megabytes in size from / dev/ urandom.
9. Each solid-state drive had randomly
selected files deleted until the drive
reached twenty-five percent capacity.
10. The deletion operation was a normal
file-system deletion, like emptying the
recycle bin of a windows operating
system.
11. Each solid-state drive was then written
to fifty percent capacity.
12. The drives were written with files
ranging from one byte to thirty-two
megabytes in size from / dev/ urandom.
13. A script was run from the researcher's
computer to produce an MD5 of the

solid-state drive continuously for two
hours. Each MD5 produced was stored
on the computer for analysis along with
the time taken to generate the MD5.
14. Data was analyzed to identify periods
of inactivity within the solid-state
drive's garbage-collection and wearleveling processes.

3.RESULTS
The results are formatted in tables with the
MD5 hash in the left column and the time
taken to produce the MD5 hash in the right
column.
The
time
is
formatted
as
minutes:seconds:milliseconds.

Table 1.
Drive A 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1

#
1
2
3
4
5
6

Hash
Duration
bac32beed77d6d8abf8638fc9a22134c 25:35.52
b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 24:43.11
b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 24:46.05
b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 22:43.24
b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 21:33.29
b358d9a12daaa67085flc3b7f5bc79c8 15:53.90

Table 2.
Drive B 2 Hour MD5 Hash Outvut, 2, Exveriment 1

Hash
Duration
1 81e5f26cf86a339b640891344d252111 20:38.00
2 14478f9c87d07333e2b094clae6b8e43 21:28.35
3 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 22:56.48
4 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:39.49
5 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:06.82
6 7d7518901d13edc55bc7faf53c3dcld4 23:02.83

#
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Table 3.
Drive C 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1

#
1
2
3
4
5

Hash
Duration
f6c0843420e90891d2c38ef218920a56 26:20.99
a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 24:55.80
a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 25:19.84
a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 22:53.60
a5187d990a919bfdec2004150fc7b71c 21:48.87

Table 4.
Drive D 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 1

Hash
Duration
1 f390b733f0e18d5c0ba9261e6d63475d 10:20.35
2 e6dbfc25b51fbd8cb0205b8303d3583c 10:41.85
3 e6dbfc25b51fbd8cb0205b8303d3583c 10:49.51
4 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:07.67
5 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:08.67
6 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:18.61
7 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:28.77
8 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:38.91
9 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:40.61
10 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 11:33.02
11 5369c891d3abe93586646338c056103e 12:23.23

#

As shown from the first experiment 's
results, the hash became consistent after the
third consecutive hash. When the same hash is
produced consecutively, the contents of the
drive are not being altered. These results imply
there are periods of inactivity in the solid-state
drive controller's housekeeping algorithms
during which validation processes are not
affected.

Except for one solid-state drive, each drive
reached a state where the hashes were not
changing after the MD5 hash program
executed once. The experiment was repeated a
second time to validate the results of the first
experiment.

Table 5.
Drive A 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2

Hash
Duration
20:38.97
1 856002ae8684fc21fl bf5c82ef568128
2 ed8e45e37d6a81aab0ac441e88187c45 22:47.51
3 ed8e45e37d6a81aab0ac441e88187c45 22:22.07
4 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 22:36.22
5 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 22:02.87
6 27764daaea24b2877db98fed10225c95 21:47.60

#
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Table 6.
Drive B 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experim ent 2

#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Hash
Duration
e189f3a8db0bfaf22fd4debcd36ee454
15:57.91
4fef78663fb013d43aa68070fd3f5c2c
15:52.62
4fef78663fb013d43aa68070fd3f5c2c
17:43.63
4fef78663fb013d43aa68070fd3f5c2c
21:02.38
4fef78663fb013d43aa68070fd3f5c2c
21:20.30
4fef78663fb013d43aa68070fd3f5c2c
20:56.44
b56ee7e5e45b25011da4508be4d296ac 20:46.62

Table 7.
Drive C 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2

#
1
2
3
4
5
6

Hash
Duration
585 740b343ff7d932cl 55 77986fd 70ce 21:46.95
c5605404931fc7de248495a87127476f 23:10.35
c5605404931fc7de248495a87127476f 22:45.43
9d 1fee b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:52.67
9d 1fee b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:26.83
9d 1fcc b5c68ccf2c2d982653 72cf944f 22:47.63

Table 8.
Drive D 2 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 2

#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Hash
Duration
d7c6dd4c527b2339c74cf07a6alcfed6 15:53.15
6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 15:53.49
6fd19891def04f0b9b009e88edcb736c 17:40.12
6fd19891def04f0b9b009e88edcb736c 20:55.82
6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 21:18.84
6fdl 9891 def04f0b9b009e88edcb 736c 20:56.35
bdecd52de5aaff448471cblaef123455 20:48.63

In the second experiment , Drive A and
Drive C produced a consistent hash after four
hashing iterations. These results match the
first experiment's results. However, the results
for Drive B and Drive D were different from
the results in the first experiment, and Drives
A and C in the second experiment.
The last hash produced for Drive B and
D was different from earlier hashes which
could indicate that garbage-collection and
wear-leveling routines were running again after
a period of inactivity. Conclusions were drawn
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from these results that the wear-leveling
and/ or garbage-collection could still run after
entering a state of inactivity. Additionally,
Drive A and Drive C only produced a
consistent hash for three hashing iterations
before the test ended. Drive B and Drive D
had produced consistent consecutive hashes for
longer but still allowed data to be altered at
the end of the test. This may be an indication
that Drive A and Drive C's wear-leveling and
or garbage-collection could also activate after a
period of inactivity.
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Additional data was gathered to examine
how often the hash changed for each drive. A
second set of tests was conducted the same as
the first tests, with the exception that the
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MD5 hashing program would execute for an
additional eight hours changing the total
execution time to ten hours.

Table 9.
Drive A 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3

Hash
Duration
1 508267f0208523d00ba7f0372966fb79 19:57.9
20:30.0
2 59a7827176 lfb9f36b30fd68efe6a860
3 lf84ca40ac124b71a57d021fa12a9e90 21:34.0
4 191ObOffd7435d4d82869961 efef7360
22:07.5
⋮
⋮
⋮
28 191ObOffd7435d4d8286996 l efef7360
20:25.9

#

Table 10.
Drive B 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3

Hash
Duration
1 63b38a64b2ecaed4949d8db6320e9f48 15:24.1
2 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7c465c3539feb04ed
15:40.4
17:40.8
3 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7c465c3539feb04ed
4 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7c465c3539feb04ed
19:24.2
19:13.8
5 9b9b0ddfelf703d 7c465c3539feb04ed
6 d72a2e1718d8a89c79da3e31ac8ab47e 21:07.5
⋮
⋮
⋮
32 d72a2e1718d8a89c79da3e31ac8ab47
21:05.3

#

Table 11.
Drive C 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experiment 3

Hash
Duration
1
0507b030bc15b96fe50f353efa3e2c55
20:40.1
2
f730256327f8f4alf9e3e754aa36b32d
20:53.4
3 0f1765678198327ad6327703dd953d70 22:25.2
⋮
⋮
⋮
26 0f1765678198327ad6327703dd953d70 23:33.9

#
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Table 12.
Drive D 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experim ent 3

Hash
Duration
1 le2d732187a3ec427efcd3422felad7b 15:13.6
2 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 15:37.6
3 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 17:17.6
4 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 19:23.2
5 8cca98ccla5634b7f033682d5b8f3e6a 18:56.6
20:56.7
6 d8ff920d43933fe2aef94fa532de5a3a
⋮
⋮
⋮
20:40.1
30 d8ff920d43933fe2aef94fa532de5a3a

#

Table 13.
Drive A 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experim ent

4

Hash
Duration
1 6a5a93c167f797bd46a80de292fb324a 22:45.9
2 8db0034679607dfa8514444f2a01 bfce 23:44.0
⋮
⋮
⋮
26 8db0034679607dfa8514444f2a01 bfce 25:32.6

#

Table 14.
Drive B 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output Experim ent

4

Hash
1 ee94482f39bca3f9244d9el 72bbccf7c
2 b3cc0f055a8b34 7e6b42fcff2f70113e
⋮
⋮
28 b3cc0f055a8b34 7e6b42fcff2f70113e

#

Duration
15:47.6
15:48.0
⋮
23:22.2

T able 15.
Drive C 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output, Experim ent

4
Hash
Duration
#
1 f3bbdad1755465de46266fc33a92713a 12:23.1
2 95a054dae1826fa8e01bff9ed45f0aa5
11:55.8
⋮
⋮
⋮
49 95a054dae1826fa8e01bff9ed45f0aa5
14:52.9

Table 16.
Drive D 10 Hour MD5 Hash Output Experim ent 4.

Hash
Duration
1 ff49c215d6b597 dbb6fde20ce635335 7
15:42.2
2 7705414505849254d18e29d096f12980 15:49.9
⋮
⋮
⋮
14:52.9
49 95a054dae 1826fa8e01 bff9ed 45f0aa5

#
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4. CONCLUSION
Based on the results seen in Table 8 through
Table 16, all solid-state drives tested produce a
consistent hash when the experiment was
extended from two to ten hours. Additionally,
seven of the sixteen tests show an early period
of consecutive, matching hashes may occur
within minutes of the start of the analysis of
the drives but change again within several
hashing iterations.
The research question is "can periods of
inactivity
be
identified
during
which
housekeeping algorithms of a solid-State drive's
controller does not affect the validation process
done by digital forensics investigators using a
court accepting hashing methodology?" The
data produced by the experiment above
provides a strong indication that given an
amount of time equal to or greater than one
and a half hours, a solid-state drive will reach
a state in which multiple matching hashes are
generated and where the validation process for
digital forensic investigators is not affected
using these solid-state drives and firmware
versions.
These results have also produced data
about the aggressiveness of the garbagecollection and wear-leveling routines of solidstate drives. The only variable changed during
the experiments was the length of time the
MD5 hashing program executed. However, the
aggression and speed of the wear-leveling and
garbage-collection routines are unpredictable in
these experiments. Experiment three for Drive
A showed the MD5 hashing program produced
different hash five iterations in a row until
reaching a state where consecutive matching
hashes were produced, which only happened in
one experiment. Drive A reached a state where
consecutive matching hashes were produced on
experiment three after one hour but reached
the same state in experiment four after only
twenty-two minutes. Additionally, Drive B
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showed a short , early consecutive matching
hashes state in experiment three, but not in
experiment four.
The results indicate that there is a period
of inactivity where the solid-state drive
produces a consistent hash over a length of
t ime that could allow an investigator to image
the solid-state drive, verify the image, and
power off the solid-state drive before the hash
changes. However, allowing the drive to reach
this period of inactivity before a forensic image
is created causes data such as slack space to be
lost and changes the drive from its original
acquisition state. Presently, that is not within
accepted forensic practices. New forensic
practices should be reviewed to adopt this
technique. If new chain of custody standards
approved of this technique, investigators could
use this technique to obtain evidence from a
forensic copy that is close to the solid-state
drive's original state. Currently, evidence
obtained from solid-state drives is usually
deemed inadmissible because solid-state drives
are self-altering and self-corroding due to wearleveling routines and garbage-collection.
When this research began, the goal was to
investigate whether solid-state drives can reach
a state that no longer interferes with the
validation process used by forensic examiners.
The research has identified a strong indication
to support this hypothesis. The experiment
wrote data mimicking a user's daily use in real
environments, and then examined four solidstate drives produced by the industry's leading
producer of drives. The results of this
experiment clearly show that a period of
inactivity for garbage-collection and wearleveling routines was identified within the tenhour window; however, this period of inactivity
has not yet been proven to be permanent.
Further research and analysis is needed on this
subject before a method can be published that
allows forensic evidence to be examined and
presented in court without question.
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APPENDIX
Drive A
Model: SAMSUNG MZ7TD128HAFV-000L1
Serial Number: S14TNSAD602536
Firmware Revision: DXT04L0Q
Drive B
Model: Samsung SSD 750 EVO 120GB
Serial Number: S33MNB0H949501E
Firmware Revision: MAT01B6Q
Drive C
Model: SAMSUNG SSD 830 Series
Serial Number: S0VUNYABA0l 720
Firmware Revision: CXMOlBlQ
Drive D
Model: Samsung SSD 840 EVO 120GB
Serial Number: S1D5NSAFB67977M
Firmware Revision: EXT0CB6Q
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